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A review of the literature on human behaviour in dwelling fires 
 
Abstract 
 
Most fire-related injuries and fatalities in the UK, and other parts of the world, continue to 
occur during fires in the home – incidents where it is acknowledged that human factors play a 
contributing role. Yet the field of fire safety lacks an up-to-date review of the literature on human 
behaviour during fires in domestic spaces. Given there is now a growing body of work looking at 
human behaviour in dwelling fires, a review of the literature in this area is timely. Drawing from 
published studies, this paper sets out what is currently known about human behaviour in dwelling 
fires and highlights the differences that appear to exist between these spaces and what is known and 
accepted about human behaviour in public, commercial and industrial spaces. This paper then goes 
on to consider the nature of “fire risk”, arguing that much of the work in this area continues to 
conflate, or fails to recognise the existence of, different types of risk profiles, instead considering fire 
risk as a single type of risk, based mainly on factors related to fatalities. However, research findings 
point towards fire risk as at least three separate forms: the risk of a fire occurring, the risk of fire 
injury and the risk of fire fatality. By drawing together the literature on human behaviour in dwelling 
fires this paper argues that those who survive dwelling fires cannot be considered as “near miss 
fatalities”, but instead must be treated as a separate and distinct group.  
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1. Introduction 
The majority of literature on human behaviour in fires is focussed upon understanding human 
behaviour in fires occurring within public, commercial and industrial spaces – there is not a 
comparable body of literature focussing exclusively upon human behaviour in single 
family/occupant dwellings1,2,3,4. Although Wood, Bryan, and Canter et al., incorporated studies of 
behaviour during dwelling fires in their early research into the area in the 1970s and early 1980s5,6,7, 
since this period it is an environment that has been largely neglected in comparison with non-
domestic settings. Moreover, the literature that does exist on human behaviour in domestic settings is 
focussed upon the identification of occupant risk factors related to fire fatalities within 
dwellings8,9,10,11, or studies of smoke alarm response and evacuation from high-rise 
occupancies12,13,14,15,16. These are of course important areas which need to be examined and 
understood. However, it is the case that such research has not been accompanied by a commensurate 
level of focus upon the behaviour and motivations of those who survive fires in single occupancy 
domestic environments – either with or without injury7,17,18. This paper will establish what is 
currently known about human behaviour in dwelling fires and highlight the differences that appear to 
exist between these spaces and what is known and accepted about human behaviour in fires that 
occur in PCI (public, commercial and industrial) spaces – presenting the case for why behaviour in 
dwelling fires is deserving of a greater research focus. In addition this paper will consider the nature 
of “fire risk”, arguing that dwelling fire risk cannot be considered as one single type of risk, instead it 
must be considered as  three separate forms of risk: the risk of a fire occurring, the risk of fire injury 
and the risk of fire  fatality. This paper asserts that despite efforts by some researchers to incorporate 
this distinction into work on dwelling fires, much of the effort in this area continues to conflate the 
three risk profiles, an approach which leads to an inaccurate and incomplete understanding of 
dwelling fires.   
2. Methods 
Internet searches of electronic databases (Google Scholar, Web of Science, EBSCOhost 
Research Databases) were undertaken using the keywords ‘human behaviour in fire’, ‘dwelling fire’, 
‘domestic fire’, ‘fire injury’, ‘fire fatality’, ‘fire risk’, ‘fire incidence’, ‘fire mortality’. In addition, 
hard copy conference proceedings from Human Behaviour in Fire, Interflam, Asiaflam, Flame 
Retardants, and the IAFSS symposia were used along with a CD-based compendium of human 
behaviour in fire papers19. Statistical and government sites in the UK and USA with online 
publications and reports were accessed along with several online university repositories (the 
University of Greenwich, the University of Huddersfield, the University of Ulster, and the University 
of Surrey) and the library catalogue of the UK Fire Service College. The focus of this paper is on 
accidental dwelling fires (ADFs). Here the distinction has been made between fires that have been 
deliberately started, perhaps as a result of arson, and fires which occur accidentally within a 
residential environment. It is noted that in the UK the general assessment made by the attending fire 
crews is sufficiently broad to always be able to make a determination concerning whether the fire 
was deliberate or accidental, thus the proportion of undetermined fires in the UK is negligible. 
Furthermore, while primarily concerned with ADFs occurring in the UK, where relevant, and in 
order to support any wider points being made, this paper also considers circumstances within the 
USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Sweden and Japan. The reason for the inclusion of these 
particular countries is because of their status as leading sources of research into human behaviour in 
fire and papers published in English on this subject.  
3. Definition of terms 
The terms ‘fatal casualty’ (also referred to as fatality, fire fatality or fire-related death) and 
‘non-fatal casualty’ (also referred to as injury) are often used in fire studies and while their 
definitions may appear self-explanatory, they can have different meanings to various audiences. The 
Home Office (the UK government department with responsibility for collecting and publishing fire 
statistics) attaches specific meanings to these terms. Fire fatalities are described as a death which is 
the direct or indirect result of injuries caused by the fire20. In this case a direct result would be a 
person being overcome and dying from exposure to the smoke and products of combustion, or 
through burns from the flames. An example of indirect result would be of a person jumping from a 
building to escape a fire and subsequently dying of the injuries sustained as a result of the fall – 
while not injured by the fire itself, the actions the person undertook because there was a fire may be 
considered to have led to their death. The death could also occur weeks or months later as the 
timescale extends for 364 days after the date of the fire, thus giving a cut-off date of a year. With 
‘non-fatal casualties’ the following four groups are defined by the Home Office for incident reporting 
standards: those given first aid at the scene of the fire; those taken to hospital with slight injuries; 
those taken to hospital with serious injuries; and those for whom there does not appear to be any 
obvious sign of injury or shock, but who are advised to attend hospital or see a doctor as a 
precaution20. Thus UK fire statistics concerning non-fatal casualties cover a range of injuries, from 
very minor (not requiring hospitalisation) to very serious (requiring hospitalisation potentially for an 
extended period) without distinction. This paper also uses the abbreviation FRS when referring to the 
fire and rescue service (also known as fire brigades or fire departments).  
4. Fire, fatality and injury trends in the UK 
Perhaps the most striking aspect about the numbers of reported fires in the UK is the scale of 
the decline that has taken place since the millennium. In the space of 15 years, total recorded fires of 
all types have more than halved, falling from 445,000 in 2000/01 to 200,000 in 2015/16 (the peak of 
572,000 fires occurred in 2003/04). Similarly, over the same period, ADFs witnessed a drop of 
approximately one third from 54,000 to just under 35,00020,21,22,23. A similar picture is evident for 
fire-related fatalities and injuries during the period 2000/01 to 2015/16 (Table 1). The number of fire 
fatalities have fallen by more than 30% and fatalities occurring in ADFs specifically have declined 
by 35%. Although, it is worth noting that, as with overall fire fatalities, a few increases in ADF 
fatalities were recorded during this 15 year period20,21,22,23. Fire-related injuries also displayed strong 
downward trends, declining by more than a third albeit, as with fatalities, with some slight increases 
during this period. This overall downward trend (and the years that saw sporadic increases) was 
similarly observed for injuries occurring in ADFs, the number of which fell by over a third20,21,22,23.  
 
Table 1: Fatalities and injuries for all fires and ADFs, 2000 to 2015 
 
Year All fire fatalities ADF fatalities All fire injuries ADF injuries 
2000/01 554 363 16,542 11,263 
2001/02 583 404 16,907 11,348 
2002/03 522 341 15,055 10,200 
2003/04 576 359 15,228 10,226 
2004/05 483 322 13,672 9,476 
2005/06 470 286 13,578 9,323 
2006/07 430 249 13,088 8,902 
2007/08 458 291 12,669 8,714 
2008/09 404 268 11,533 7,987 
2009/10 416 275 10,652 7,244 
2010/11 388 268 11,134 7,776 
2011/12 380 244 11,300 7,729 
2012/13 350 217 10,300 7,354 
2013/14 322 219 9,748 6,872 
2014/15 325 209 9,232 6,496 
2015/16 367 237 9,493 6,490 
 
Source: DCLG, 201520; Home Office, 201621; Scottish Fire and Rescue Service, 201622; Welsh Government, 
201623. NB. From 2008, data collected changed from the UK to Great Britain. 
 
However, it has not always been a story of decline. The number of fires in 2015 is around 
double that experienced in 1950 – a trend that may appear to correlate with the growth in the number 
of UK dwellings since 1950 (there are now twice as many dwellings – approximately 28 million in 
201424 – while the population is a third greater – 64 million in 201325,26 – than in 1950).  As Figure 1 
shows, however, there was actually a period of growth that was then halted and reversed. The 
number of dwelling fires underwent a steady increase since 1950, slowing somewhat through the 
1980s and 1990s before beginning to decline at the start of the millennium. The point to note here is 
that – accepting that the figures represent an amalgam of both deliberate and accidental dwelling 
fires, the distinction only being made from year 2000 onwards – the fall in reported dwelling fires 
means that in the space of 15 years the current figure has fallen to approximately the same level as in 
the late 1960s.   
 
 
 
Figure 1: UK dwelling fires, 1950 to 2015 (ADFs recorded from 2000). Source: DCLG, 201027; DCLG, 
201520; Home Office, 201621; Scottish Fire and Rescue Service, 201622; Welsh Government, 201623. NB. 
From 2008, data collected changed from the UK to Great Britain. 
 
To make international comparison possible, Figure 2 presents UK dwelling fires per 100,000 people 
for the same period (1950 to 2015). It is interesting to note that since the millennium the number of 
fires per 100,000 people has halved, despite a ten percent increase in the population over the same 
period. 
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 Figure 2: UK dwelling fires per 100,000 people and the UK population, 1950 to 2015. Source: DCLG, 201027; 
DCLG, 201520; Home Office, 201621; Scottish Fire and Rescue Service, 201622; Welsh Government, 201623; 
ONS, 201826.   
 
An overview of dwelling fire fatalities since 1960 shows that their downward trend was first 
observable at the end of the 1970s, with the number of fatalities declining by 47% in the period 1979 
to 2000 and then by a further 38% in the period since the millennium20,21,22,23 (Figure 3). It may be 
reasonable to assume that these figures will be subject to historical limitations imposed by the varied 
data collection and reporting standards of different FRSs – and in some countries that may be the 
case. However, the UK has employed a standardised and nation-wide method of fire incident 
reporting for almost 70 years. The current electronic reporting system, known as the Incident 
Recording System (IRS) was introduced in 2009 and replaced the hard copy Fire Damage Report 
(FDR1), which was itself a replacement for the earlier K433 fire report form which had been in 
existence since the late 1940s. In varying formats all three methods of incident data collection 
sought, where appropriate, to obtain detailed information about the incident: the origin, cause, 
location, size and type of fire, building type and construction methods, and any fatalities or injuries. 
This means that, through information collected by the FRS on incidents attended, the UK has a rich 
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data set on fires stretching back over a number of decades. 
 
 
Figure 3: Fatalities and injuries in dwelling fires, 1960 to 2015. Source: DCLG, 201027; DCLG, 201520; Home 
Office, 201621; Scottish Fire and Rescue Service, 201622; Welsh Government, 201623. NB. From 2008, data 
collected changed from the UK to Great Britain. 
 
Again, in order to allow international comparison to be made, dwelling fire fatalities are presented 
per 100,000 people (see Figure 4). It is interesting to note that when normalised per 100,00 people, 
both the number of dwelling fires and the number of dwelling fire fatalities (Figures 2 and 4 
respectively) declined from their respective peaks by a larger proportion compared to the counts 
(Figures 1 and 3). By 2015, the number of dwelling fires had declined by 46% (72,500 to 38,800) 
from their peak in 1997 (Figure 1). However, when measured per 100,000 people, the decline from 
the peak year in 1997 was 52% (124.3 to 59.6 people per 100,000).  
With dwelling fire fatalities, a decline of 68% has occurred since the peak in 1979, falling from 865 
to 281 in 2015 (Figure 3). By comparison, over the same period, the number of dwelling fire 
fatalities fell from 1.54 to 0.43 per 100,000 people – a fall of 72%. The greater decline in the 
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normalised number of dwelling fires and fire fatalities is all the more impressive as the overall UK 
population has increased over this period. 
However, as shown in Figure 5, these declines in the incidence of dwelling fires and associated 
fatalities have not been accompanied by a decline in the likelihood of dying or being injured should a 
dwelling fire occur. 
 
 
Figure 4: UK dwelling fire fatalities per 100,000 people and the UK population, 1960 to 2015. Source: 
DCLG, 201027; DCLG, 201520; Home Office, 201621; Scottish Fire and Rescue Service, 201622; Welsh 
Government, 201623; ONS, 201826.  
 
5. The importance of understanding human behaviour in ADFs 
Despite the large declines that have been presented, upon closer examination of the data for 
dwelling fires, a slightly more complicated picture emerges. For although ADFs account for between 
only 8% and 20% of all fires by type they are the cause of between 58% and 70% of all fire-related 
injuries and fatalities. Furthermore, since the millennium, despite the decline in the number of fires, 
fatalities and injuries, this proportion has remained broadly consistent20,21,22,23 (Figure 5). In fact, 
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since 1999 the fire fatality rate in dwelling fires has reached something of a plateau, fluctuating 
between 0.63 and 0.72 fatalities per 100 fires20,21,22,23,27. The same is also true with the risk of being 
injured in a dwelling fire, as since the millennium the injury rate has also remained fairly constant at 
between 17.6 and 20.6 non-fatal casualties per 100 dwelling fires, with a median of 19.320,21,22,23.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: ADFs as a proportion of all fires, fire-related fatalities and fire-related injuries, 2000 to 2015. 
Source: DCLG, 201520; Home Office, 201621; Scottish Fire and Rescue Service, 201622; Welsh Government, 
201623. NB. From 2008, data collected changed from the UK to Great Britain. 
 
As a result, it can be seen that the reductions in overall numbers of fires, fatalities and injuries 
conceal an important point, which is that while the risk of having an ADF has reduced, the risk of 
dying or being injured in an ADF has not. Consequently, as accidental fires in the home continue to 
be the leading cause of all fire-related fatalities and injuries they are an area about which a greater 
understanding needs to be developed. In addition, there is a significant socio-economic cost from 
fire, particularly when considering that in 2008 (the most recent year for which data are currently 
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available) the cost of fire in England (accidental and deliberate fires of all types) was estimated at 
£8.3 billion, which includes the cost of damage to property, lost business and the cost of injuries and 
fatalities, through treatment costs and lost economic output arising from fire-related injuries – to say 
nothing of the stress, emotional and mental trauma caused to people by fire28. Indeed, the economic 
impact of such injuries and fatalities is considerable as, using this model, the estimated cost of fatal 
and non-fatal casualties was £1.4 billion for England alone28.  
British statistics reveal that the leading source of ignition in cases of ADF fatalities is 
smokers’ materials (defined as cigarettes, cigars and pipes) which result in over a third of all fatalities 
(37%). This is followed by cooking appliances at 14% and space heating appliances at 9%. The three 
main sources of ignition in cases of ADF injuries are cooking appliances, which account for more 
than half of all fire-related injuries (53%), other electrical appliances and smokers’ materials, the 
latter two each accounting for 10% of injuries20. In the majority of cases these sources of ignition do 
not occur independently from the actions of people*; human factors are the leading cause of fire20. 
For all of the data collected by FRSs, data on the actions occupants undertake are not 
collected and recorded in detail. Where occupant behaviour is considered it will be where it is seen 
as relevant to the cause of the fire, as opposed to attempting to provide a narrative account of a 
person’s actions throughout the duration of the fire – a focus best described as looking at how the fire 
affected the occupant, rather than the reverse. Furthermore, in the rare cases where that has been 
examined and compared, evidence supports the view that experts’ (i.e. operational firefighters) 
predictions of human behaviour in fire do not match what has been observed on actual behaviours 
undertaken by survivors of dwelling fires29,30. Consequently a greater understanding of the 
behaviours, motivations and cognitions of those experiencing a dwelling fire will assist FRSs in the 
                                                             
* Within the British fire statistics The ‘cause of fire’ is defined as: “The defect, act or omission leading to 
ignition of the fire” (DCLG, 201520, p55), while ‘source of ignition’ describes: “The source of the flame, spark or 
heat that started the fire” (DCLG, 201520, p54). These two categories are used to offer greater detail in fire 
reporting by attempting to distinguish between the antecedent actions or circumstances that led to the fire and 
the physical cause of the ignition itself. 
 
UK and overseas with incident planning for operational response to and management of dwelling 
fires, firefighter and incident command training courses, emergency call handling procedures, and 
fire prevention and community safety initiatives. 
6. The incompatibility of applying existing knowledge to fires in dwellings 
Based upon what has been presented above, it would be reasonable to reflect on whether the 
considerable amount that is known about human behaviour in fire in PCI spaces could be applied to 
the domestic setting. However, as this paper will demonstrate, the greatly different sets of 
circumstances and associated influences acting upon occupants during a dwelling fire mean that it 
would be unwise and over-simplistic to automatically transfer accepted behavioural responses and 
actions during fires which occur in PCI spaces to domestic spaces.  
It was not until the early 1970s and the work carried out by Wood and the UK’s Fire Research 
Station that the first formal study dedicated to investigating the actions (as distinct from movement) 
people undertake when encountering a fire in a building, and using data derived from numerous real 
fires in various building types, was undertaken5. Following the work undertaken by Wood, a study 
was commissioned by the U.S. Department of Commerce’s National Bureau of Standards and led by 
John Bryan6. Both studies utilised questionnaire surveys as the main method of data collection with 
dwellings comprising the single greatest building type. Wood’s study contained data from 952 
incidents and 2193 participants, for Bryan’s study the corresponding figures were with 335 incidents 
and 584 participants5,6. Importantly, although not specifically differentiating between building types 
within the analysis and subsequent reporting, both studies identified behaviours that are now 
recognised as key aspects of human behaviour during a fire; in general terms both studies found 
evidence of people attempting to tackle fires; movement through smoke, re-entry behaviour, and 
clear differences between males and females in behaviour and frequency of certain behaviours 
(males were more likely to exhibit fire-fighting behaviours whereas females were more likely to alert 
others and exit the property)5,6. Also in this first study of behaviour in fire was Wood’s demonstration 
of the theory that people tend to behave rationally during fires, an emergent idea that was gaining 
increased interest following earlier work challenging the idea of “panic”31. Even at this early stage in 
the study of the area, Wood argued that, when looking at behaviour in real fires, people generally 
behave in a rational and logical manner, given the information available to them at the time5. 
Among the limited literature in this area, one of the few studies to undertake a specific 
discussion of the differences between fires in the home, hospitals, multiple occupancies and public 
buildings was that by Canter et al.7,32. In this work it is argued that in fires in the home, people 
frequently find early cues ambiguous and frequently ignore or misinterpret these initial cues32. The 
authors state that this ambiguity, ignoring cues and general absence of an immediate response is 
characteristic of the informal and unstructured situation found in a single occupancy dwelling 
compared to a PCI space. However, it is important to note that the point made by Canter et al. about 
the delayed initial response to cues is contradicted by later work from other researchers, which 
instead argues that the initial response to fire cues within the domestic environment is actually 
quicker than for other building types – although often without awareness among the responding 
occupants that those cues are representative of a fire4,33,34,36,37,38. Although the amount of work 
conducted in this area is limited, Proulx states that the typically “lethargic” response to fire alarms, 
voice communication, and the initial cues of a fire is different in low-rise residential buildings, as 
occupants will rapidly respond to and investigate unusual smells, noises, or other changes to that 
immediate environment34. This difference is explained as being the result of the feelings of 
responsibility for the clearly defined physical space represented by this type of building33,34. Proulx 
goes on to identify the key factors that exert an influence upon response time within what she calls 
the pre-movement phase, of which building type is identified as playing an important role35. In 
contrast to the delay so frequently observed for other types of building, cues generated from fires 
occurring in dwellings (such as the smell of burning or the sound of a smoke alarm) are sufficient to 
precipitate a swift response33,34,35.   
More recently, this was highlighted in a qualitative study of behaviour during dwelling fires, 
in which it was observed that participants acted quickly in response to a variety of cues4. In line with 
Proulx, it is believed that the speed of the response to these initial cues – irrespective of whether 
those present knew at that time there was a fire or not – is a consequence of the nature of the socio-
physical environment, in which people are in a clearly bounded and defined physical and social 
space that represents their most intimate environment. As such this sense of ownership, responsibility 
and control over this space (shared or otherwise), and likely presence within this space of loved ones, 
leads people to act in a way that is less bounded by the constraints (such as a fear of embarrassment, 
a desire to conform, a lack of direct responsibility towards that space) that may exert an influence 
upon behaviour and cue response within PCI spaces and buildings7,18,33,34,35.  
With regard to terminology, Proulx refers to the ‘pre-movement phase’35, which is the first 
part of a two-phase description of the occupant’s fire response (the other being the phase where the 
occupant commences evacuation). However this approach tends to over-simplify the process as it 
suggests that movement only occurs as part of an evacuation, which is not the case as people move 
around the building, potentially undertaking many tasks before they begin to actively start to 
evacuate (if indeed evacuation occurs at all). Consequently a more compelling way of describing the 
process is to define the two phases as a Response Phase and an Evacuation Movement Phase. During 
the Response Phase the occupant responds to incident cues which may involve them undertaking a 
range of activities before finally starting purposeful evacuation movement towards an exit or place of 
relative safety36,38,39. Furthermore, the duration of the Response Phase is called the response time 
rather than the pre-movement time. 
7. Closed versus open building systems 
It would appear that the key factor that underpins the differences between behaviour in fires 
across environments and spaces is that buildings may be considered as either “closed” or “open” 
systems40. Closed-building systems (which describe PCI spaces) are those where activities are 
formalised and managed and in which processes are controlled. Such closed-building systems 
manifest themselves through the presence of building codes (both prescriptive and performance-
based), and identifiable, often hierarchical management structures (relating to both the building and 
those using it)40,41. By contrast dwellings may be considered as open-building systems; places where 
there is not a formalised management structure relating to the building and the manner in which it is 
used, including the absence of any roles prescribed by fire safety codes and regulations40,41,42. This 
means that people’s responses in the single occupancy domestic environment will not be subject to 
the social influences exerted upon them by the requirements and structures inherent within closed-
building systems40,43. Moreover, where the fire and smoke conditions allow, more people are able to 
exercise a greater degree of choice in their actions in relation to the fire. In addition, Proulx and Fahy 
have stated that within domestic spaces a greater number of occupants are more likely to have a 
responsibility for others such as their loved ones, principally children or the elderly44. Consequently, 
from this seemingly straightforward distinction arise a number of important differences related to the 
two kinds of system which, when considering fires in dwellings, may be summarised as follows: 
 
 A greater (primarily familial) attachment to the building, people and items within it7,18,33,34. 
 Fewer incidences of task attachment and faster response to alarms and ambiguous cues 
2,4,33,34,35,36,37,45,46.  
 Absence of staff or fire wardens to organise and direct behaviour according to formalised 
procedures and operating within recognised hierarchies7,32,40,41,47,48.  
 A greater propensity to attempt to tackle and or mitigate a fire.5,6,32,40,41,43,49,50.  
 Greater incidence of re-entry5,6,51,52. 
 Greater familiarity with the environment in what is generally a smaller space, resulting in 
wayfinding being less of an issue than in PCI spaces53,54. 
 Different occupancy types and characteristics; for example, greater numbers of children and the 
elderly5,6,49. 
 The presence and effects of feelings of guilt and or responsibility for causing the fire and the 
resultant desire to deal with this before deciding whether to make an emergency call or not4. In 
the UK, USA, Canada and Australia it is estimated that between 60% and 80% of dwelling fires 
are not reported to the FRS20,50,53,55. 
8. High-rise dwellings 
Considering high-rise occupancies it may be argued that they display some elements of both 
systems as they present a combination of open building systems (the private spaces represented by 
the individual flats or apartments) and closed systems (the communal areas, stairwells, lifts, and 
building entrances and exits). In this regard such occupancies may be considered to present 
something of their own category, where, although less formal than a PCI space, a form of overall 
building organisation nonetheless exists32. Canter et al. argue that the pattern of behaviour in high-
rise occupancies is actually more complex than for single occupancy dwellings, something that is a 
function of both the number of potential information sources and appropriate actions7. The same 
researchers also identify that there are often fewer attempts to fight a fire compared to single 
occupancy dwellings7,32. Other differences within such environments include Bryan’s observed 
phenomenon of “convergence clusters”49. Identified from his studies of hotel fires, this describes 
behaviour where individuals gather, or cluster, together in rooms as a form of communal refuge, and, 
importantly, was noted in the Lakanal House high-rise residential fire that occurred in London, 
UK3,16,49. Proulx also argued that by their very nature, PCI spaces, including high-rise occupancies, 
need to take into account specific building characteristics, not just occupancy classification33,34,35. In 
addition to this the management of a building is an important characteristic. Both of these are not 
features present in single occupancy dwellings33,34,40. Moreover, during a fire in a high-rise 
occupancy, the initial response of those alerted by an alarm, but who have not received direct 
confirmation of the fire, is likely to be characterised by the ambiguity and delayed response that is 
commonly seen in PCI spaces33,45. Similar characteristics were also observed in an earlier study 
conducted by Brennan on a fire in an 18-storey block of flats in Australia, which found frequent 
delay in response to alarms and recorded times from first being alerted to beginning evacuation that 
ranged from one minute to over twenty minutes56.  
9. The study of fire fatalities in dwellings and dwelling fire fatality risk factors 
The literature that considers risk factors related to fatal dwelling fires predominantly derives 
from work undertaken in the UK, USA, Japan, Australia and New Zealand and a number of 
consistent themes emerge. As mentioned earlier, fires started by discarded or improperly 
extinguished cigarettes are identified as the leading ignition source of fires that result in fatal 
outcomes; a finding observed not just in the UK but also in these other geographical 
regions9,10,57,58,59. Those who are identified as being over-represented in dwelling fire fatalities are: 
the young and the old (those aged under five and over 65 years respectively); those who have a 
physical or cognitive impairment; those who undertake or engage in behaviour which is likely to 
limit their ability to recognise and or respond to a fire (generally speaking the consumption of 
alcohol or recreational drugs); those who live in social isolation; smokers; and those living in areas 
of deprivation8,10,54,59,60,61. However, it is important to note that this describes a mixture of 
interrelated causal and non-causal factors. For example, being a smoker does not on its own make a 
person more likely to die in a fire. However, among smokers there may be a higher incidence of 
individuals who have a characteristic or engage in behaviour that limits their ability to recognise and 
respond to a fire the home. Examples of which may include having a physical impairment, or alcohol 
consumption to a point where the ability to recognise and respond to fire cues becomes nullified8,57. 
There may also be a higher risk of a linked secondary factor: an increased risk that the children of 
smokers will have a greater likelihood of obtaining lighters and matches in the house. It has been 
demonstrated in studies looking at causes of fire fatalities and the presence of factors that may impair 
physical and cognitive response that there has often been an association with fires where the source 
of ignition is smoking materials and evidence of intoxication through alcohol59. 
9.1 Deprivation 
The issue of deprivation is important and deserves consideration, but not because it is a 
causal factor in and of itself, indeed to assume so would be a mistake. Rather it is the case that in 
deprived areas one tends to find a greater agglomeration of factors that increase the risk of fire 
fatality and with this an over representation of groups and individuals who display those factors 
57,59,61,62,63. 
9.2 Age of housing 
In the USA, with its larger number of wooden-built properties and much younger housing 
stock than the UK, the age of housing has been identified as being directly related to the fire safety of 
the property and likelihood of a fire starting10,64. However, within the UK the age of housing alone is 
not identified as an issue, rather it is the quality of housing – in the UK there is no relationship 
between the age of a property and its quality. It has been argued that the quality of housing is closely 
related to deprivation and the associated risk factors surrounding the incidence of dwelling fires. 
Other factors associated with poor quality housing are overcrowding (increasing the risk of injury 
should a fire start), and poor maintenance of communal areas, escape routes, and smoke alarms61.  
9.3 Age of occupants 
In considering age, among the elderly age-related health conditions may restrict the ability to 
identify fire-related risks within the home and, in the event of a fire breaking out, impair the ability 
to identify the fire cues and limit the ability to move away from the fire to a place of safety10,65. 
Large numbers of the elderly also live alone and experience a greater degree of social isolation60,66, 
consequently, prior to a fire they may have not been in receipt of fire safety advice and during a fire 
there may not be others in the property to aid evacuation and offer assistance54,61. Furthermore, 
following a fire there is an age-related reduction in the ability to overcome and recover from both 
burn injuries and the injuries sustained from exposure to the products of combustion67,68,69. For 
young children, in addition to difficulties in being woken by smoke alarms, once a fire starts they 
lack the experience to recognise the risk posed by the fire and smoke and associated cues and also 
the ability to respond effectively, including the capacity to evacuate unaided10,64,67,70,71,72.  
9.4 Cultural heritage and native language ability 
Native language refers here to the official language of the country and the language spoken 
by the vast majority of the inhabitants. For countries such as the UK, Australia and USA this would 
be English. In their study on the 16 fatal fires that occurred in 2001 in New South Wales, Australia, 
Lewis and Lear identified those from non-English speaking backgrounds as being at increased risk57. 
However, this was because those who originated from non-English speaking backgrounds were 
overly represented in other risk groups such as low socio-economic status and living in public sector 
housing. It also raises an interesting question about whether a poor standard of English impaired their 
ability to access and interact with government and local authority services – including sources of 
home fire safety advice. Although in the USA it has been argued that non-white ethnic groups are at 
higher risk of experiencing an ADF, within the UK there appears to be no clear link between 
ethnicity and fire risk73,74. Moreover, it is important to clarify that among studies undertaken in the 
USA, it is the over representation of certain non-white ethnic groups in deprived areas, deprivation 
and single parent households that are associated with more fires, rather than their ethnicity itself. 
However, it is important to understand whether an increased fire risk exists among those who have 
recently entered the UK from countries which do not have a comparable standard of fire safety 
culture and risk awareness, as recent work from Sweden suggests that this may be the case there75. 
10. The identification of different risk profiles: fire occurrence, fire injury, fire fatality 
Despite the work on identifying the occupant risk factors related to fire fatalities, and the 
ability through fire service data and fire investigation reports to identify the most likely cause of a 
fire, an important point that has received only sporadic attention is the understanding of the 
distinction between being at risk of a fire occurring and being at risk of injury or death during a fire. 
Among the studies looking at fire fatality-related risk factors there has been a tendency not to 
differentiate between risk of a fire occurring, risk of injury, and risk of fire fatality, but simply 
amalgamate the three; an approach that has led to two questionable assumptions: firstly, that those 
groups who have more fires are the same as those groups who tend to die in fires; secondly, what 
these authors call the “conveyor belt theory”, namely the assumption that once a fire starts those 
present move along a pre-determined path of increasing injury severity that, without the intervention 
of others, ends in death, thereby confining injuries to the status of near miss fatalities4,51,52,59,76,77,78.  
A paper by Breslin et al. regarding changing the kinds of behaviours that lead to ADFs 
identified four main behaviours associated with dwelling fires: smoking, alcohol consumption, 
cooking practices and use of electrical appliances77. Unfortunately, in addition to failing to identify a 
distinction between risk of fire occurrence and fire fatality, this paper contains a number of 
questionable statements. Although the authors correctly state that cooking appliances are a common 
source of ignition, this paper is factually incorrect in its assertion that chip pans were a common 
cause of non-fatal fire incidents, as data from the Great Britain fire statistics show that for the period 
2013-14, chip pans were the cause of just 6.7% of all ADFs and 15.3% of all non-fatal casualties20. 
Another factual error concerns the assertion that electric blankets and space heaters are “a common 
cause” of fires. Again a check of the same set of fire statistics reveals that space heaters were the 
source of ignition of just 3.6% of all ADFs while electric blankets were the source of ignition in a 
mere 0.3% of ADFs20; figures which could hardly be considered to fit the definition of a common 
cause. 
A study by Lehna et al. outlined the aim of creating and validating a “cartographic risk 
model” to identify geographical areas in which there is a greater risk of fires occurring (although the 
types of fires are not explicitly stated, the risk factors the authors identify suggest a focus on 
dwelling fires)79. Unfortunately, despite the paper’s stated aims, the attempt to do this is undermined 
by the fact that the authors use terminology relating to risk of fire occurrence and risk of fire injury 
interchangeably, treating them as one and the same. This means that throughout that paper there are 
numerous references to risk and risk factors without an identification of which type of risk is being 
referred to: fire occurrence or fire injury. Unfortunately, this represents a failure to identify and 
understand that the risk of fire occurrence and fire injury are in fact two different types of risk. 
However, an increasing body of work has begun to question this simplistic, and erroneous, 
assumption8,71,75,80. One of the earliest pieces of work to highlight this difference was the study 
carried out using data from 150 fatalities from 109 fatal residential fires between 1990 and 1995 in 
the State of Victoria in Australia54. The study considered the characteristics and behaviour of victims 
and survivors and identified the important distinction between the risk of a fire occurring and the 
ability to respond effectively to a fire once it has started. 
Of a slightly different but nonetheless related focus is the work by Xiong et al. which, 
drawing from Australian coroners’ fire fatality reports and non-fatal fire incident data, sought to 
identify and compare the difference in risk factors associated with fatal compared to non-fatal 
ADFs62. This work identified the main risk factors associated with fatal fires as psychotropic and 
sedative drug intake, discarded cigarettes, living alone, being aged over 70 and being asleep. For 
non-fatal ADFs the associated risk factors were cooking fires, electrical fires, the kitchen being the 
room of fire origin, a stove (oven) being involved in the fire starting, and the fire being in a one- or 
two-family dwelling62. Although this work identifies that risk factors for fatal fires differ from non-
fatal fires and offers a useful overview of the differences between these two risk profiles, the work 
remains constrained by its inability to tease apart the nature of each of the factors, i.e. whether they 
are related to ignition or risks posed once a fire started. Moreover, it adopts a fairly deterministic 
standpoint, in that risk factors related to non-fatal outcomes are the circumstances around the fire 
starting and the building type; clearly these have a role to play, but the work’s emphasis on these 
alone fails to recognise the importance of individuals’ actions and behaviours. Although the authors 
touch on this in their conclusion regarding fatal fires, namely the already well-established fact that 
there is an association with cognitive or physical impairment in fatal fires, human agency as applied 
to non-fatal fires is not really put into focus. Instead the authors limit their scope to view the 
determinants of non-fatal fires as the consequence of environmental-based risk factors. The closest 
consideration of human behaviour is a brief section that discusses “reported or observed behaviour 
before the fire”; yet the conclusion of this section is that “hosts who displayed unusual behaviours 
were at higher risk of dying in accidental residential fires than those who behaved normally before 
the fire” (Xiong et al., 201562, p43). As the authors state the time frame “before the fire” could be 
days or months, and they offer no identification or definition of what constitutes either “unusual” or 
“normal” behaviour before a fire. Nor is any context or background given as to how such “unusual” 
or “normal” behaviour before a fire may affect the risk of dying during a fire. Consequently, it is 
difficult to make inferences from this work about the role of human behaviour in non-fatal fires, an 
outcome that further underscores the need for a robust body of evidence of human behaviour during 
ADFs.  
Of note is the qualitative work on fire risk that has been undertaken by the University of 
Salford in conjunction with Greater Manchester FRS71,81. Using in-depth interviews with those who 
have experienced a fire in their home, this work offers a different approach in that, rather than 
attempting to offer a quantified form of risk analysis, it seeks to understand how the experience of an 
ADF influences that individual’s perceptions of fire occurrence risk, the manner in which they reflect 
on the fire (through the type of terminology and choice of language used) and their opinion of the 
likelihood of experiencing another fire71,81. In general terms, findings from the work have shown that 
those who have experienced an ADF tend to focus on future fire occurrence risks only in relation to 
the type of fire they experienced, not generic fire occurrence risks81. Through its adoption of a 
deliberately non-standard perspective, this work offers a useful and much-needed contribution to the 
literature on fire risk more generally. 
At the other end of the methodological scale a study carried out in Sweden has specifically 
sought to identify and quantify what differences may exist in risk factors related to having a fire in 
the home and dying in such a fire75. Based upon a sample of over 13,000 respondents, 405 of which 
had experienced a fire, the study concluded that, differentiated for respondent characteristics and 
household characteristics, the risk of a dwelling fire occurring was higher among younger compared 
to older age groups (defined as 18 to 30 years compared to those over 61 years), increased among 
those born outside of the Nordic countries (it is argued that this is due to higher smoking rates among 
immigrants and cooking practices that are more likely to result in burn injuries among children in 
such families) and increased among those with “higher” educational levels (as defined by the 
International Standard Classification of Education). Although unable to account for the reason why 
dwelling fires are more common among those with a higher educational level – the study’s authors 
somewhat unconvincingly speculate that it may be related to such groups having higher incomes and 
therefore more “technical” (presumably electrical) equipment – this is nonetheless an important, and 
surprising, finding, particularly as low educational level has been identified as a risk factor related to 
fire fatalities57,61,63. Regarding household characteristics, an increased fire occurrence risk was 
observed with households with five or more occupants and those with children, particularly aged 6 to 
12 years; something that is believed by the authors to be accounted for by this age group being the 
most likely to experiment with matches and lighters. In their summary the authors make an important 
point that, based upon these results, the risk of dying in a house fire is not due to a higher frequency 
of fires.  
What becomes clear is that the risk of a fire occurring and the risk of becoming a casualty due 
to a fire must be distinguished. Moreover, those who die and those who survive ADFs (either with or 
without injury) must be considered as at least two different groups. Consequently it is inaccurate to 
regard ADF injuries simply as near miss fatalities as this viewpoint rests on an assumption that all 
occupants are passive and moving on a pre-determined course that would end in death if not for the 
intervention of others or some stroke of good fortune. On the contrary, recent studies have begun to 
show that during an ADF occupants actively move around the property and undertake a number of 
tasks during the fire4,51,52. There is also the possibility that through their own actions during the fire, 
occupants could avoid becoming a casualty. 
11.  Conclusions 
It is apparent from the discussion of the existing literature that, since the initial work carried 
out on human behaviour in fire by Wood and Bryan and the direct comparisons of occupancy and 
building types undertaken by Canter et al., compared to the abundant and rich body of literature on 
human behaviour in PCI spaces, there has been a very limited focus upon understanding how people 
behave during a fire in dwellings, particularly single family/occupant dwellings. It is clear that the 
greatly different environmental, physical and social circumstances that are present in dwelling fires 
compared to fires in PCI spaces means that knowledge relating to human behaviour in the latter 
cannot be assumed to be applicable to the former. This gap in the knowledge of behaviour in 
dwelling fires has only been partially filled to date as the work that has dealt with domestic 
environments has been dominated by a focus upon identifying the occupant and environmental risk 
factors related to dwelling fire fatalities. From this literature a consensus has emerged about those 
groups who are at increased risk of dying with the risk factors having been identified in studies 
undertaken in the UK, North America, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. Moreover, there are also 
identified similarities in the causes of dwelling fires that result in fatalities. Recently, there has begun 
to be a greater recognition of the distinction between the risk of having a fire, the risk of being 
injured, and risk of dying in a fire. The realisation that those who are injured in fires are not near 
miss fatalities but are in fact a group that is different from those who die in fires has led to some 
initial attempts to tease out and identify the determinants related to these two very different risks. 
Understanding why people are injured in fires is important and more work needs to be done in this 
area; something that underscores the need for a contemporary and comprehensive understanding of 
human behaviour in fires in the home.  
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